可信设计技术的脆弱性分析与防御

The Vulnerability Analysis of Design-for-trust Technique and Its Defense

片上系统(SoC)设计人员通常使用第三方知识产权(3PIP)核来实现特定功能。由于这些3PIP核不受信任,所搭建的SoC受到了硬件木马(HT)的威胁。作为可信设计技术的一个子集,多样性冗余机制在使用不可信3PIP建立可信计算方面具有较好的应用前景。然而,该文发现通过探索激活序列所设计的硬件木马能够破坏多样性冗余机制的安全性。鉴于此,该文提出一种改进的基于检查点的多样性冗余机制来防御此类攻击。

System-on-Chip(SoC) designers typically use third Party Intellectual Property(3 PIP) cores to implement target functions. As these 3 PIP cores are not trusted, the underlying SoC suffers from the threat of Hardware Trojans(HTs). As a subset of design-for-trust techniques, the diversified redundancy is promising in establishing trustworthy computings of SoCs. However, It is shown that the diversified redundancy can be defeated by HTs that explores triggering patterns. Therefore, an adapted diversified redundancy technique is proposed to defend against such kind of attacks.