经济增加值考核对国有企业研发投入的经济后果研究

Research on the Economic Consequences of Economic Value Assessment on R&D Investment of State-Owned Enterprises

2010年国务院国有资产监督管理委员会对央企正式实施经济增加值(EVA)考核,为了探究EVA考核实施对企业研发投入经济后果的影响,以2007-2013年沪深A股中央国有上市公司为研究样本,运用负二项分布模型、双重差分模型从专利和市场价值两个层面进行理论分析和实证检验.研究发现,EVA考核实施后企业的专利申请量均显著提高,并且实施企业在EVA考核实施后专利申请量相比未实施企业显著提高;对于市场价值,EVA考核虽然提高了国有企业进行研发投入的积极性,但市场价值都没有显著提升.

In 2010, the State-Owned Assets Supervision Commission of the State Council formally implemented EVA assessment on the central enterprises. In order to explore the impact of EVA assessment on the economic consequences of R&D investment, this paper takes A-share state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2013 as the research sample, and uses the negative binomial distribution model and Double difference model to carry out theoretical analysis and empirical test from the perspectives of patents and firm value. The results show that for patent output, after the implementation of EVA assessment, the patent applications of enterprises with and without EVA assessment are significantly increased and the result is significant for the implemented enterprises. For enterprise value, although EVA assessment improves the enthusiasm of state-owned enterprises for R&D investment, it does not gain a significant improvement of enterprise value.