平台品牌赋能情境下考虑信息不对称的供应链渠道冲突

Supply chain channel conflicts considering asymmetric information under platform brand empowerment

随着平台型电商企业对供应链合作伙伴的赋能行为迅速增加,对供应链成员的运营决策及收益产生了举足轻重的影响.在平台型电商企业进行品牌赋能的情境下,研究由一个平台型电商企业、一个零售商和一个其他渠道供应商构成的供应链中,如何设计合适的激励机制以缓解供应链成员之间的垂直渠道冲突,并在信息不对称的条件下,剖析作为核心企业的平台型电商企业如何运用机制设计的方法来识别零售商从其他渠道订购产品的质量水平.研究表明,平台型电商企业可以通过设计包括混合策略与分离策略在内的激励机制来提升零售商从平台型电商企业订购产品的数量和比例.若零售商从产品质量较高的其他渠道供应商订购产品的概率较高时,则平台型电商企业采用分离策略更有助于提升零售商的总订购量,反之则应采用混合策略.平台型电商企业在分离策略下获得的期望利润要大于混合策略,并且均大于不向零售商提供激励机制的情形.

In recent years, the empowerment behavior of e-commerce platforms to supply chain partners has increased rapidly, which has important influence on the operational decisions and benefits of supply chain members. In the scenario of e-commerce platforms’ brand empowerment behavior, this paper studies the incentive mechanism considering vertical channel conflicts among supply chain members in a supply chain, which composes of one e-commerce platform, one retailer and one supplier of other channel. Under the condition of information asymmetry, it also discusses how the e-commerce platform as a core enterprise can use the mechanism design method to identify the quality of products ordered by the retailer from the other channel supplier. The results show that the e-commerce platform can increase the number and proportion of products ordered by the retailer from e-commerce platforms by setting incentive mechanism under the pooling strategy and the separating strategy. If the retailer has a high probability of ordering products from other channel suppliers with a higher product quality, the e-commerce platform should adopt separating strategy, which is more conducive to increasing the total order volume of the retailer, otherwise it should adopt the pooling strategy. The expected profit of e-commerce platforms under the separating strategy is greater than that of the pooling strategy, and both are greater than the case where no incentive mechanism is provided to the retailer.