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上下合谋:地方政府兴建政绩工程的解释框架——纵向府际互动视角下的案例分析 被引量:5

Collusion Among Higher-Level and Lower-Level Governments:The Interpretation Framework of the Local Governments’Enthusiasm for Building Vanity Projects--A Case Study From the Perspective of Vertical Intergovernmental Interaction
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摘要 地方政府热衷于建设政绩工程是中国政治场域的老问题。从组织学角度考察纵向政府间的互动关系发现,中间政府和基层政府在政绩驱动下达成的合谋助推着政绩工程的出现,表现为邀功、过度执行与监督软化、“共赢”、责任下移的非正式运作。上下合谋的形成内嵌于政府治理模式和纵向府际关系的深层次背景,其逻辑在于:集权决策模式下的治权下移赋予地方政府执行自主性,基层政府能够在利益契合的项目上进行违法违规的政绩营造;中间政府虽负有监督职能,但职责同构模式将两者联结成责任和利益一致的共同体,促使中间政府对政绩工程软化监督。两级政府关系从理想科层制中的“监督—执行”演化为上下合谋,因此整个地方政府都缺乏治理政绩工程的动力。若要整治由上下合谋催生的政绩工程,只有从形成合谋的权力链条之外加以监督。 There is an old problem in Chinese political field that local governments are enthusiastic for building vanity projects.Examining the interactive relationship between vertical governments from the perspective of organization,the collusion among the intermediate governments and the grassroots governments driven by the political performances promotes the emergence of the vanity projects.The collusion in the construction of the vanity projects is reflected in four informal operations:credit claiming,over-execution and supervision softening,“win-win”and the downward shift of responsibility.The logic lies in:the downward of governance power under the centralized decision-making model endows local governments the autonomy of execution,and the grassroots governments can create political performances in an illegal way on projects with matching interests.Although the intermediate governments have a duty to supervise subordinates,they are connected into a community with the shared responsibilities and interests by“isomorphic responsibility”governmental system,prompting the intermediate governments to soften the supervision of the vanity projects.The relationship between them has evolved from the“supervision-execution”in the ideal bureaucracy to collusion.Therefore,the local governments are lack of the motivation to govern the vanity projects.The way to govern the vanity projects spawned by the collusion is dependent on the subjects outside the chain of power that forms the collusion.
作者 程同顺 杨明 Cheng Tongshun;Yang Ming(Nankai University, Tianjin 300350)
出处 《天津行政学院学报》 北大核心 2021年第5期3-14,共12页 Journal of Tianjin Administration Institute
基金 天津市哲学社会科学研究规划青年项目“新时期村干部腐败治理创新研究”(TJZZ16-001Q)。
关键词 上下合谋 政绩工程 地方政府 中间政府 利益共同体 collusion among higher-level and lower-level governments vanity projects local governments community of shared interest
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