风险约束情境下基层干部避责的机制诱因、策略逻辑与治理对策

Mechanism Inducement,Strategy Logic and Control Measure in the Blame Avoidance of Cadres at Grass-Roots Level Under Risk Constraint Situations

处于压力型体制末梢与社会直观之中的基层干部,其行为选择动因不仅在于政绩竞争,还在于风险规避。风险约束情境下基层干部避责是一种“局限下取利”的“约束性选择”。科层组织压力、风险层层下移和社会民众的利益主体意识及集体行动,导致一些基层干部行为被风险规避所主导。风险约束情境下基层干部避责的机制诱因在于弱激励与泛化的干部考核“一票否决制”,其策略逻辑表现为“不出事”逻辑与“准退出”博弈。需要通过实现基层干部激励与约束的适度平衡,来解决基层干部避责问题。

The behavior choice motivation of grass-roots cadres is not only in competition but also in risk aversion at the end of pressure system and social intuition.The blame avoidance of cadres at grass-roots level is a“constrained choice”of“taking profits under limits”.The pressure of bureaucratic organizations,risk layers down,the interest subject consciousness of the public and collective action have led to some grass-roots cadres’behavior being dominated by risk aversion.The mechanism of incentive of blame avoidance of cadres at grass-roots level lies in the weak incentives and the generalization of“one ticket is overruled make”in assessment of cadres.Its strategy logic is manifested as“no accident”logic and“quasi-exit”strategy.It is necessary to balance the incentive and restraint of grass-roots cadres to solve the problem of avoiding responsibility.