转移支付对企业税负的影响研究——基于信息不对称背景下地方策略性征税视角

A Research on the Impact of Transfer Payment on Corporate Tax Burden——Based on the Perspective of Local Strategic Tax Collection under the Background of Information Asymmetry

基于2008—2017年深沪两市全部A股上市公司财务数据和省级地区财政、经济数据,实证研究了中央转移支付对企业实际税负的影响效应。结果发现:中央转移支付的存在为地方政府和企业之间提供了合谋的契机,地方政府有动力通过降低税收努力来谋取地方利益,从而降低了企业的实际所得税负。并且,中央转移支付的这种替代效应对地方国有企业实际所得税率的影响最为显著,从侧面说明了相对于其他企业,地方政府的“父爱主义”促使其更有动力与地方国有企业进行合谋。同时,反腐败力度、地方财政压力、僵尸企业规模和地区经济发展水平均会影响转移支付对税收努力的替代效应的大小。上述研究通过分析央地政府间信息不对称下地方政府的策略性行为,从政企合谋的角度提出中央转移支付对企业税负的影响机制,丰富了地方税收努力与中央转移支付间互动关系的相关研究。

Based on the financial data of all A-share listed companies in the stock markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2017 and the regional fiscal and economic data,this paper studies the effect of central transfer payment on the effective tax rate of enterprises.It find that the central transfer payment provides an opportunity for collusion between local governments and enterprises.For the purpose of keeping local interests,the local governments have an incentive to lower the effective tax rate by reducing tax effort.Besides,the heterogeneity test finds that the substitution effect of central transfer payment has the most significant impact on local state-owned enterprises,which indicates that the“fatherhood”of local governments makes them more motivated to collude with local state-owned enterprises.Meanwhile,the substitution effect of transfer payment on tax efforts is affected by factors like anti-corruption effort,local financial pressure,scale of zombie enterprises and regional economic development level.By analyzing the strategic behaviors of local governments under the background of information asymmetry between central and local governments,this paper puts forward the influence mechanism of central transfer payment on effective tax rate from the perspective of government and enterprise collusion,which enriches relevant researches on the interaction between local tax efforts and central transfer payment.