两职分离背景下高管权力差距与投资效率

Top Executives Power Gap and Corporate Investment Efficiency

董事长和总经理两职分离是企业中常见的一种治理结构,但关于董事长和总经理之间不同的权力配置是否以及如何影响企业投资决策行为,相关的研究文献较少。本文尝试从所有权、专家权和声望权三个维度刻画董事长和总经理之间的权力配置,进而考察权力差距对企业投资效率的影响。结果发现,上市公司董事长和总经理之间存在的权力差距可以提高企业的投资效率,即投资不足和过度投资程度都得到有效抑制;在权力差距的三个维度中,声望权差距的影响最大,其次是所有权差距,而专家权差距的影响最弱。进一步研究发现,当上市公司为非国有性质、董事长在上市公司领取薪酬以及政府干预较少时,权力差距对投资效率的影响效应会更加明显。本文的研究不仅从权力差距的视角拓展了企业非正式治理机制与投资效率的相关研究,也为上市公司如何构建高管团队和人才选拔以提高企业决策效率提供了一定的参考。

Chairman-CEO separation is the important governance structure of listed companies. While the studies about power allocation between chairman and CEO are relatively insufficient. This paper attempts to describe the power distribution between the chairman and CEO from the perspective of power gap,and then investigate its impact on enterprise investment efficiency. The empirical results show that when the power gap between the chairman and CEO is larger,the investment efficiency is higher. Among the three dimensions of the power gap,the influence of the prestige power gap is the largest,followed by the ownership power gap,while the influence of the expert power gap is the weakest. Further,the effect of power gap on invest efficiency is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises,enterprises whose chairman receive compensation from listed companies and enterprises exposed to less government intervention. This paper enriches the literatures of corporate governance and investment efficiency from the perspective of power gap and also provides some reference for top management team construction.