摘要
在中国家族企业主流的代际传承模式之下,"父子共治"是一个无法回避的独特现象,但鲜有研究关注该现象及其背后蕴含的深层逻辑。本文基于父爱主义理论研究父子共治企业的创新决策,并将父辈为帮扶子女顺利接班进行的企业创新"布局"刻画为代际传承中的深谋远虑效应。这一研究从过去主要关注家族企业代际传承是否有利于创新,转向对代际传承中如何创新及其微观机理的研究。本文以2006~2017年中国上市家族企业的样本实证发现,父子共治显著促进家族企业的创新投资,同时这种影响在两代亲缘关系越近、二代年龄越小以及二代具有丰富社会资本时更为明显。拓展检验发现,父子共治企业的创新资源更多配置到低风险领域,这一创新决策不仅反映了父辈为二代未来接班自治企业构建竞争优势的长远规划,更需规避当前的创新风险。进一步地,本文发现风险承担能力是父子共治企业创新投资的重要影响机制,但二代决策权力并未显著增强父子共治企业的创新并且创新投资呈现先强后弱的趋势,以及通过创新显著提升了父子共治企业的价值。本文的研究框架将父子共治、创新决策及其父爱主义的深谋远虑效应有机结合起来,拓展和深化了家族企业代际传承与创新的理论研究。
Under the mainstream intergenerational succession model of Chinese family enterprises,"father and son co-gover-nance"is an unavoidable unique phenomenon,but few studies pay attention to this phenomenon and the deep logic behind it.Based on the theory of paternalism,this paper studies the innovation decision-making of"father and son co-govemance"enterprises,and depicts the layout of enterprise innovation carried out by parents to help their children succeed smoothly as the foresight effect in intergenerational inheritance.The research is focuses on how to innovate and its micro mechanism in intergenerational inheritance not on whether intergenerational succession of family enterprises is conducive to innovation as the earlier literature.Based on the samples of Chinese listed family enter prises from 2006 to 2017,the paper finds that"father and son co-governance"promotes the innovative investment of family enterprises significantly.In the same time,this impact is more obvious when the relationship between the two generations is closer,the second generation is younger,and the second generation has rich social capital.Further study finds that the innovation resources of"father and son co-governance"enterprises are more allocated to low-risk areas.This innovation decision not only reflects the long-term plan of parents to build competitive advantage for the second generation of future successor autonomous enterprises,but also needs to avoid the current innovation risk.Further,this paper finds that risk-taking ability is an important influence mechanism on the innovation investment of"father and son co-governance"enterprises,but the second generation's decision-making power does not significantly enhance the innovation;the innovation investment shows a trend from strong to weak,and significantly improves the value of the enterprises.The research combines"father and son co-govemance",innovative decision-making and the foresight effect of paternalism,and deepens the theoretical research on intergenerational succession and innovation of family enterprises.
作者
祝振铎
李新春
赵勇
Zhu Zhenduo;Li Xinchun;Zhao Yong
出处
《管理世界》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第9期191-206,232,235,236,共19页
Journal of Management World
基金
国家自然科学基金重点国际(地区)合作研究项目(71810107002)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71672196)
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71602195)
广东省哲学社会科学规划项目(GD20CGL48)
广东省人文社科重点研究基地项目(2018YS003)的资助。