摘要
本文认为,亚里士多德在《范畴篇》中虽然用“主体”标准肯定了种属的第二实体的地位,但是已经用“这个”(todeti)标准把种属排除出实体范畴之外。《形而上学》Ζ卷其实已经明确否定种是实体和定义的对象,而且属加种差的定义方式并不是对实体的定义,也就是说,种根本不是实体。本文特别指出,亚里士多德在Ζ4已经说明了对ti esti的首要的回答就是todeti,是实体。同时本文也指出,因为Ζ卷成书的特殊性和论证的渐进性,种概念与实体概念还是有些藕断丝连的意味,所以本文还要一一指出文本中的模糊之处,指出如何因文本的原因造成了种概念的复杂性。
This paper tries to present the complexity of relationship between the concept of species and substance and the object of definition in Metaphysics Z.This paper argues that Aristotle has denied species as substance(ousia)in Categories and Meta physics Z evidently in accordance with the criterion of a this(tode ti).And in Meta physics Z4 Aristotle argues that a this(tode ti)and substance is the primary answer to"what is"(ti esti)instead of species for granted the answer.At the same time,this paper also points out that,because Aristotle confirms that substance or form in the same species is the same,and Because the writing particularity and the progressive discus-sion of Z volume,the relationship of form(eidos/morphe)and species(eidos)is complicated,also the object of definition.In addition,on the question of the university of definition,species is a hard conception.This paper will also point out Aristotle's gains and losses.
出处
《哲学门》
CSSCI
2012年第2期67-85,共19页
Beida Journal of Philosophy
关键词
种(eidos)
主体
这个
形式
species(eidos)
subject(hypokeimenon)
a this(tode ti)
form(eidos)