摘要
将《中庸》之“诚”揭示为本真的情感,是符合原典儒家的思想的;但其前提是这种“原始情感”不能被理解为西方意志主义、生命哲学式的“生存冲动”,也不能与作为形而上者的“本性之善”混同。“本性之善”与“善观念”是一种有意义的区分;但这种“绝对与相对”的区分毕竟属于传统形而上学“本体与现象”、“形上与形下”的思考方式,无法用以阐明本真的情感。小人的造成或君子沦落为小人,并非因为对“善观念”的固执。所以,所谓“君子困境”其实并不存在,故无须引入基督教的“罪人意识”。
It will fit the thoughts of original Confucian that“sincerity”(诚)in The Doctrine of the Mean(《中庸》)is shown as genuine affection,if the viewpoint is based on the premise of that the“instinctual emotion”can not be understood as both“life impulse”of Western voluntarism or life philosophy and“good nature”as the Metaphysic.Although it is significant to separate“the idea of good”from“good of human nature”,the differentiation between“the absolute”and“the relative”falls into such forms of thinking as“noumenon and appearance”or“the Metaphysic and the Physic”in traditional metaphysics after all,which cannot explain genuine affection clearly.It is not in any sense that he keeps to“the idea of good”that a villain comes into being or that a gentleman degenerates into a villain.So“gentleman's quandary”is nonexistent and we have no need to introduce“the sense of origi-nal sin”into China from Christian.
出处
《哲学门》
CSSCI
2012年第2期309-323,共15页
Beida Journal of Philosophy
关键词
儒家
中庸
诚
情感
君子
基督教
罪人意识
Confucianism
The Doctrine of the Mean
sincerity
affection
gentleman
Christianity
the sense of original sin