高层管理团队的融洽关系能影响研发投入吗?——基于薪酬管制的视角

Can TMT’s Relation Affect R&D Investment:Based on the Perspective of Pay Control

文章针对薪酬管制、高层管理团队融洽关系的形成以及与研发投入之间的关系进行了理论分析和实证检验。研究发现,由于薪酬管制的存在,国有企业董事长与CEO的融洽关系要显著弱于非国有企业;薪酬管制程度越强,国有企业董事长与CEO的融洽关系越弱;董事长与CEO的融洽关系将提升公司研发投入水平,也会提升公司的创新产出水平,从而进一步提升公司实质性创新产出水平。研究结论对于放松薪酬管制,促使董事长与CEO融洽关系的形成,进而提升企业创新具有重要的借鉴意义。

This paper makes theoretical analysis and empirical test on the relationship between compensation regulation,the formation of senior management team relationship and R&D investment.The study finds that due to the existence of compensation regulation,the harmonious relationship between Chairman and CEO of state-owned enterprises is weaker than that of non-state-owned enterprises;the greater the degree of compensation regulation,the weaker the harmonious relationship between Chairman and CEO of state-owned enterprises;the more harmonious the relationship between Chairman and CEO,the higher the level of R&D investment of the company.The conclusion of this study has important reference significance for relaxation compensation regulation,promoting the formation of a harmonious relationship between Chairman and CEO,and improving the level of R&D investment of enterprises.