摘要
利用演化博弈模型研究了厂商和消费者在厂商网络定向广告互动中的演化路径,并仿真了隐私信息增益、处罚程度、消费者维权意识水平、隐私信息获取成本等参量对演化系统的影响.研究表明:厂商的隐私增益、政府对厂商违规利用消费者隐私信息的处罚程度以及消费者的维权意识均存在最优值,这些参数大于或小于最优值均不利于演化系统的快速稳定.维权意识和处罚程度对演化系统的影响机理相似、与隐私信息增益的影响不同.厂商获取消费者隐私信息的成本过高时,厂商将不开展网络定向广告.
The evolutionary game model is used to study the evolutionary path of manufacturer and consumer in the interaction of manufacturer network targeted advertising,and the influence of privacy information gain,punishment degree,consumer awareness level,privacy information acquisition cost and other parameters on the evolution system is simulated.The results show that:there are optimal values for the privacy gain of the manufacturer,the punishment degree of the government for the illegal use of consumer privacy information,and the awareness of protecting the rights of consumers.The influence mechanism of the consciousness of rights protection and the degree of punishment on the evolutionary system is similar,but different from the influence of privacy information gain.When the cost of acquiring consumer privacy information is too high,the manufacturer will not carry out network targeted advertising.
作者
李敏
田永杰
LI Min;TIAN Yong-jie(School of Business,Sias University,Xinzheng 451150,China)
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
2021年第17期233-242,共10页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
河南省民办高校品牌专业建设项目“工商管理”(教政法[2017]344号)
河南省民办高校资助项目“市场营销”(教政法[2020]162号)。
关键词
隐私信息
定向广告
演化博弈
private information
targeted advertising
evolutionary game
