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如何说明肯定命题的假和否定命题的真?--兼答李主斌并与张继成商榷 被引量:4

How to Acccount for the Falsity of a Positive Proposition and the Truth of a Negative Proposition?--Reply to Li Zhubin and Discuss with Zhang Jicheng
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摘要 真之符合论有两种形态,即基于对象的符合论和基于事实的符合论。李主斌对“事实”概念的辩护以及对笔者质疑事实概念的反驳,没有很强的说服力。在基于事实的符合论框架下,为了说明肯定命题的假和否定命题的真,通常引入“否定事实”,但仔细分析后可以发现,后者是以下三个因素共同起作用的结果:事物的正面状态、认知主体的预期、推论,故其至多是一种推论性“存在”,没有独立的本体论地位。设定“否定事实”已经面临很多诘难,如本体论膨胀、随附性、不可感知性、缺乏因果力。对这些诘难已经提出了很多反驳,如二难论证,自我挫败论证,“否定事实”的四个作用——构成作用、因果作用、制造机遇的作用和使真作用,但这些反驳完全可以被再次合理地反驳掉。 There are two forms of the correspondence theory of truth:the object-based correspondence theory and the fact-based correspondence theory.Li Zhubin’s defense of the concept of“fact”and his objections of the author’s challenges to the concept of fact are not cogent.Under the framework of fact-based correspondence theory,“negative fact”is usually introduced to explain the false of affirmative proposition and the true of negative proposition.but after careful analysis,it can be found that the positing of negative facts is the result of the following three factors:the positive states of things,the expectation of cognitive subject,and inference,so negative facts at most are a kind of inferential“existence”without independent ontological status.Positing of negative facts has faced many criticisms,such as ontology expansion,supervenience,imperceptibility and lack of causal force.Many replies to these criticisms have been put forward,such as dilemma argument,self-defeating argument,and the making roles of negating facts:constitution(e.g.hole-making),causation(event-making),chance-making,and truth-making.However,these replies can be reasonably rejected again.
作者 陈波 CHEN Bo(School of Philosophy,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)
出处 《河北学刊》 CSSCI 北大核心 2021年第5期42-54,共13页 Hebei Academic Journal
基金 2017年度国家社会科学基金重大项目“当代逻辑哲学重大前沿问题研究”(17ZDA024)。
关键词 真之符合论 对象 事实 肯定命题 否定命题 否定事实 correspondence theory object fact positive proposition negative proposition negative fact
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