家族化管理与审计师风险决策

Family Management and the Risk Decisions of the Auditors

根据代理理论、管家理论和社会情感财富理论,对家族企业中家族化管理这一非正式治理机制对审计师风险决策的影响机理进行了分析,并运用2013—2017年A股上市家族企业样本进行实证检验。研究结果表明,家族化管理可以影响审计师风险决策行为,具体表现为审计费用和非标准审计意见出具概率均显著降低,且家族企业高管与实际控制人亲缘关系越近,审计费用和非标准审计意见出具概率会越低。第一类代理成本在家族化管理和家族成员之间的亲缘关系对审计师风险决策的影响中起到了部分中介作用。进一步研究发现,在控股股东两权分离程度较低的情况下,家族化管理对审计费用和非标准审计意见出具概率的降低作用更为显著;从企业生命周期视角来看,家族化管理对审计师风险决策的影响在企业衰退期并不显著。对家族企业的审计风险特点的分析,有助于家族企业治理制度的选择以及审计师对家族企业治理风险的应对。

Based on agency theory,housekeeping theory and socio emotional wealth theory,this paper analyses the influence mechanism of the informal governance mechanism of family management on auditors'risk decision making behavior,and uses the sample of A share listed family enterprises from 2013 to 2017 to carry out an empirical test.The empirical results suggest that family management can affect auditors'risk decision making behavior,which is manifested in the significant reduction of audit fees and the probability of being issued non standard audit opinions.The closer the family business executives are to the actual controller,the lower are the audit fees and the probability of being issued non standard audit opinions.Agency Costs I plays a mediating role between family management and family members’kinships and auditors’risk decision making.When the degree of separation between ownership and control is relatively low,the effect of family management on audit fees and the probability of being issued non standard audit opinions is more significant.From the perspective of enterprise life cycle,the influence of family management on auditors'risk decision making is not significant in the recession period.This paper analyses the characteristics of audit risk of family business,which is helpful to the choice of governance system of family business and the response of auditors to governance risk of family business.