机会主义抑或信息传递:公允价值估计中管理者自由裁量的行为动机研究——来自我国上市公司股票期权的经验证据

Opportunism or Information Transmission:A Study of Managerial Discretionary Motivation of Fair Value Estimates:Empirical Evidence from the Stock Options of Chinese Listed Companies

利用手工收集的上市公司股票期权(ESO)公允价值估计表外披露数据,实证研究管理者自由裁量行为及其动机。研究发现:管理者在ESO公允价值估计中存在明显的自由裁量行为,表现为显著的估计偏差,尤其是低估;ESO公允价值估计偏差与管理者盈余管理和薪酬自利显著相关,但与私有信息含量没有显著关系,表明在公允价值估计中管理者存在机会主义动机,而信息传递动机不明显。进一步研究发现:机会主义动机下的管理者自由裁量显著降低了公允价值估计的准确性,并且机会主义动机主要存在于公司治理和外部审计监督较差的公司中;ESO公允价值估计偏差尤其是低估偏差显著降低了分析师预测准确性。

Using manually collected data on fair value estimates(FVEs)of employee stock options(ESO)disclosed in the notes to financial statements,this paper investigates the managerial discretion over FVMs and its incentives.We find that managers exercise considerable discretion over the FVEs of ESOs,and the discretion causes the severe bias of FVEs,particularly at the level of under valuation.Earnings management and salary self interest of managers are significantly related to the discretion of ESO fair value estimates,however,which is not significantly related to managers’private information.The results indicate that opportunistic incentives explain the bias of FVEs instead of informational incentives.We also find that the opportunistic incentive significantly reduces the accuracy of FVEs,and is predominated in firms with lower quality of corporate governance and independent audit.Besides,the result shows that the FVE bias,especially the understate discretion,significantly reduces the accuracy of analyst forecasts.