国有资本授权经营是否有助于缓解国有企业非效率投资?

Can Authorized Operation of State-owned Capital Alleviate the Inefficient Investment of State-owned Enterprises?

本文以纳入国有资本授权经营制度改革试点范围的国有控股上市公司为处理组样本,采用双重差分方法,分别从政府干预和内部人控制视角对国有资本授权经营与国有企业非效率投资的关系进行了理论分析与实证检验。研究结果表明,国有资本授权经营对抑制国有企业过度投资和投资不足均具有显著作用。进一步研究表明,与中央企业和行政垄断行业企业相比,国有资本授权经营对地方国有企业、非行政垄断行业企业过度投资的抑制作用更显著,但对投资不足的影响不存在显著差异;公司类别未对国有资本授权经营与国有企业非效率投资的关系产生显著影响;机制检验证明,国有资本授权经营能够通过减少政府干预来抑制国有企业过度投资,能够通过治理管理层的代理行为来抑制国有企业过度投资和投资不足。

Taking the state-owned listed companies included in the pilot scope of the authorized operation system reform of state-owned capital as a sample,this paper uses the difference-in-difference method to analyze the relationship between the authorized operation of state-owned capital and the inefficient investment of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of government intervention and insider control.It is found that the authorized operation of state-owned capital plays a significant role in restraining the overinvestment and underinvestment of state-owned enterprises.Further research shows that compared with central enterprises and administrative monopoly enterprises,the authorized operation of state-owned capital has a more significant effect on restraining the overinvestment of local state-owned enterprises and non-administrative monopoly enterprises,but the effect is not significant in the samples of underinvestment;and the company category has no significant impact on the relationship between the authorized operation of state-owned capital and inefficient investment of state-owned enterprises.Besides,the mechanism test shows that the authorized operation of state-owned capital can restrain not only the overinvestment of state-owned enterprises by reducing government intervention,but also both overinvestment and underinvestment by governing the agency behavior of management.