基于公平关切的政府与涉水企业监督博弈分析

Supervision game between government and water-involved enterprises based on fairness concern

针对水资源治理问题,构建了政府、上游企业和下游企业的博弈决策模型,求解了三方博弈的纯策略Nash均衡和混合策略Nash均衡。在此基础上进一步探讨了公平关切心理行为对博弈均衡的影响,并针对政府治理水资源污染问题提出了相应的管理对策。研究结果表明:在不考虑公平关切的情况下,企业的偷排行为主要受企业偷排时政府对其的惩罚力度、企业不偷排时政府对其的奖励力度和企业不偷排成本等影响。在考虑公平关切心理行为的情况下,上游企业越关注公平,其选择“偷排”策略的概率就越大;当上游企业的公平关切程度较小时,政府监管的概率和下游企业不偷排的概率成正比;当上游企业公平关切程度较大时,政府监管的概率和下游企业不偷排的概率成反比。

In view of the problem of water resources management,this paper constructs the game decision model among government,upstream enterprise and downstream enterprise,and solves the tripartite game of pure strategy Nash equilibrium and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.We then further explore the effect of fairness concern on the game results,and put forward corresponding management countermeasures for the government to deal with water pollution problems.The results show that without considering the fairness concern,the illegal discharge behavior of enterprises is mainly affected by the government’s punishment for illegal discharge,the government’s reward for legal discharge,and the cost of legal discharge.When considering the psychological behavior of fairness concern,the more concerned with fairness,the higher probability for the upstream enterprise to choose“illegal discharge”strategy.When the fairness concern of upstream enterprises is low,the probability of government supervision is positively correlated with the probability of downstream enterprises’legal discharge.When the fairness concern of upstream enterprises is high,the probability of government supervision is negatively correlated with the probability of downstream enterprises’legal discharge.