作为灵魂问题的理念学说--对于《理想国》“两个世界”论述的灵魂论考察

Theory of Forms as Psychology--A Psychological Investigation about the“Two-World”Theory in Plato's Re public

尽管《理想国》五卷到七卷谈论的哲人教育与第十卷涉及的诗人批判皆涉及“两个世界”之学说而展开,然而这两套论述间却存在诸多差异。本文前四部分意图指明这两套论述如何通过诉诸“哲人灵魂”之探讨而得以贯通,而五章到七部分则会指出对于“两个世界”论述进行的灵魂论解读所依旧包含的疑难,以及这些疑难如何可能通过诉诸《蒂迈欧》得以某种程度的解答。本文意图表明,对《理想国》《蒂迈欧》之灵魂学说,特别是“哲人灵魂即正义灵魂”的深入考察,对于我们更好地理解“两个世界之分离与关联”这一柏拉图对话之核心问题大有裨益。

The“Two-World”theory was referred to twice by Plato in the Re public in conspicuously incoherent expositions:once in Chapter V-VII,the other time in Chapter X.In the current paper,I intent to argue,firstly,that the coherence between the two expositions could be redeemed by virtue of the discussion of the“philosophical soul”,secondly,that a further scrutiny of the Timaeus on the“philosophical soul”offers a profounder understanding of this coherence.In short,l claim that the psychology(or the theory of soul)given by the Republic and the Timaeus,especially the statement that the philosophical soul is the just soul,could be essential in solving thetraditional puzzles in Plato's metaphysics based on the“Two-World”theory.