笛卡儿的意志概念--理解Cogito的另一条线索

Descartes'Concept of Will——A Reinterpretation of the Cogito

笛卡儿对意志追随理智下判断的强调,使意志看起来像是一种消极被动的能力。本文试图澄清,笛卡儿的意志是一种积极主动的能力,它是自我决定的。意志构成了“我思”(Cogito)的基础性的行动。第一沉思中,不断推进的怀疑,正是意志先于理性,积极主动地朝向有待理智检查的对象。这尤其体现在意志反转,推动理智构想魔鬼时。这在排除了一切外在实存物体,包括身体,作用于理智的可能性的同时,使理智更为清楚和分明地感知到意志行动本身,进而完全专注于心智自身,从而感知到“我”的实存。“我在”的得出既不是亨利所说的自我感受,也不是马里翁所谓的原初他者对自我的作用,而是意志对理智的作用和理智对意志的感知。这一感知所构成的经验不同于对外在物体的表象,而是一种内在的、自我同一性的直接感知。第四沉思体现的则是无限的意志,在迈向真理的过程中,借助理性,自我规定界限,避免陷入任意决断,从而落入意见之中。这也正是意志的真正自由之所在。

Descaretes’insistence that the will should follow the intellect to make a judgment makes the will appear to be a passive power.This article tries to show that the Cartesian will is an active power,and it is self-determination.In fact,the will is the foundational action of the Cogito.In the First Meditation,it is the will which is prior to the intellect that directs the latter to the doubtable object.Especially,when the will turns in the opposite direction,and pushes the intellect to conceive the demon,this procedure excludes the intellect's pcrccption of the external body,including my body,so the intellect can perceive the will's action more clearly and distinctly.Further,it can concentrates completely on the mind and perceives my existcnce.So,thc way from Cogito to sum is neither a self-affection.nor an originary other who acts upon the ego.Rather,it is the will that acts on the rcason,and at the same time the reason perceives the will.This experience is different from the representation of the external objects.For it is an immediate perception,which is innate and self-identitv.Actually,in the Fourth Mediation,the infinite will restricts or determinates itself by the intellect,so that it can prevent itself from becoming arbitrary and hence being captured by the opinions.This is the true freedom of the will.