有限理性下民航安保参与方策略演化博弈分析

Evolutionary game analysis on strategies of civil aviation security participants under bounded rationality

文章基于演化博弈理论分析框架,在有限理性前提下构建民航公安、风险旅客和机场航司三方策略的演化博弈模型,基于系统动力学模拟仿真民航公安、风险旅客和机场航司3个主体决策过程的演化策略路径选择以及影响动态博弈系统稳定状态的重要因素,研究得出三方博弈主体的初始策略概率对动态系统稳定的影响、公安机关强打击成本对动态系统稳定的影响和风险旅客不守法的额外收益对动态系统稳定的影响。结果表明,政府与企业的协同合作十分重要,政府对于选择强打击策略的公安机关需要给予更多的政策支持,并且要采取打击措施降低风险旅客不守法所获得收益,同时机场航司需要更加配合公安机关的行动。

Based on the analysis framework of evolution game theory,this paper constructs a three-way strategy evolution game model of civil aviation public security,risk passengers and airport airlines under the premise of limited rationality.Based on system dynamics simulation,the evolution strategy path selection of three main decision-making processes of civil aviation public security,risk passengers and airport airlines and the important factors influencing the stability of dynamic game system are simulated.The effects of the initial strategy probability of the three-way game subject,the strong strike cost of the public security organs and the additional profits obtained by the risk passengers who do not obey the law on the stability of the dynamic system are obtained.The results show that the cooperation between government agencies and enterprises is very important.The government needs to give more policy support to the public security organs that choose the strategy of strong strike,and take strike measures to reduce the profits obtained by the risk passengers who do not obey the law.Meanwhile,the airport airlines need to actively coordinate with the public security organs.