基础设施视角下供应安全对天然气博弈的影响

Effect of supply security on natural gas game from the perspective of infrastructure

近年来以我国为代表的进口国因基础设施滞后频频出现天然气供应安全问题,对此将“供应安全”这一非利润目标纳入传统效用函数,构建了进出口两国共建基础设施的动态博弈模型,运用微分对策理论,求得双方的最优策略及效用.结果表明,供应安全意识、成本分担契约均能推动基础设施的建设,但在短期内的效果有限;通常情况下,供应安全意识、成本分担契约均能使双方效用实现帕累托改善,只不过需要在长期下才能突显,但如果基础设施基准量过高,供应安全意识可能反而起到负效应,使进口国效用下降.

In recent years,natural gas supply security problems frequently occur in the importing countries represented by China due to the lag of infrastructure.Hence,a dynamic game model for the natural gas trade market is developed.The theory of differential game is used to find and analyze the optimal solutions for both sides:the importing country and exporting country.Results show that the supply security awareness and the cost-sharing contract can both play a positive role in the natural gas infrastructure,though the effect may be limited in the short term.Generally,the supply security awareness and the cost-sharing contract can both benefit both sides,which may show up in the long run.However,if the benchmark infrastructure stock is too high,supply security awareness may play a negative effect on the utility of the importing country.