“以旧换再”和“以旧换新”策略下制造商和再制造商的博弈分析

Game analysis of manufacturer and remanufacturer under the strategies of old-for-remanufacturing and old-for-new

针对原始制造商实施“以旧换新”策略、隶属于同一集团的关联再制造商同时实施“以旧换再”策略的运营决策问题,运用博弈理论构建了多元需求下的两阶段模型,并分析了最优均衡解的变化趋势.研究表明,随着置换回收价格的提高,“以旧换再”消费市场会挤兑“以旧换新”消费市场,或者“直购新品”消费市场会挤兑“直购再制品”消费市场,但两者不会同时发生;而政府“以旧换再”补贴的提高会引起这两类挤兑效应同时发生;“以旧换再”补贴能够促进废旧产品回收,扩大再制造产品市场份额,但不一定有利于原始制造商和关联再制造商的盈利;只有当补贴超过某一阈值时,其对企业盈利的负面影响才会消除,并且通过提升再制造技术的节能降本水平,可以降低阈值条件.

In order to solve the operational decision problem in which the original manufacturer implements the strategy of old-for-new and the associated remanufacturer affiliated to the same group implements the strategy of old-for-remanufacturing simultaneously,this paper establishes a two-stage model under multiple demands by using game theory,and analyses the changing trend of the optimal equilibrium solution.The results show that the consumer market of old-for-remanufacturing cannibalizes the consumer market of old-for-new,or alternatively the consumer market of directly purchasing new products cannibalizes the consumer market of directly purchasing remanufactured products when the replacement recycling price increases.However,the two types of cannibalization effects occur simultaneously only when government subsidy of old-for-remanufacturing increases.The subsidy can promote the recycling level of used products and expand the market share of remanufactured products,but not necessarily enhance the profits of the original manufacturer and the associated remanufacturer.Only when the subsidy exceeds a certain threshold,can its negative impact on corporate profits be eliminated.Further,the threshold condition can be reduced by raising the level of energy-saving and cost-reduction of remanufacturing technology.