政府干预、金融科技创新与经济高质量发展研究——基于动态博弈视角的解释

Government Intervention,Financial Technology Innovation and High-Quality Economic Development:An Explanation based on Dynamic Game Theory

文章以金融创新风险为核心,构建了包含金融科技企业和政府干预的动态博弈模型。博弈结论表明:政府对金融科技企业干预的实质是风险分担问题,政府有意愿将金融创新风险转嫁给金融科技企业;政府对金融科技企业的干预意愿取决于金融科技企业初始发展策略。在不完全信息下,政府干预和金融科技创新发展之间存在两个均衡:低效均衡和帕累托均衡。对此,减少政府干预、加速金融科技创新、推动经济高质量发展存在两条路径:一是提升政府治理能力,为金融科技企业承担更多金融创新风险;二是增强政府对金融科技企业的知识认知,为金融科技创新制定更好的政策。

This paper takes financial innovation risks as the core,and constructs a dynamic game model that includes financial technology companies and government interventions.The conclusions of the game shows that,firstly,the essence of government intervention in financial technology companies is the issue of risk sharing,and the government is willing to transfer financial innovation risks to financial technology companies;secondly,the government's willingness to intervene in financial technology companies depends on the initial development strategy of financial technology companies.Under incomplete information,there are two equilibriums between government intervention and the high-quality development of financial technology companies.One is an inefficient equilibrium and the other is Pareto equilibrium.The final equilibrium depends on the government's initial intervention willingness and negotiation time.In this regard,there are two paths for reducing government intervention to achieve high-quality development of the financial technology industry.One is to enhance the government's governance ability to undertake more financial innovation risks for financial technology companies;the other is to enhance the government's knowledge of financial technology companies and formulate good policies for financial technology companies.