考虑公平偏好的两阶段众包创新激励机制研究

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Two-stage Crowdsourcing Innovation based on Fairness Preference

为解决多任务多阶段众包创新委托代理的激励问题,使接包方更努力完成任务,文章基于现代经济学公平偏好理论,建立了考虑任务参与者公平偏好的双任务两阶段委托代理模型。借助模型分析了众包创新过程中公平偏好程度与接包方的努力程度、产出分享比例及众包创新绩效等的关系。结果显示,对称信息情况下公平偏好程度对众包创新的两个阶段产出效益无影响。非对称信息情况下随着公平偏好强度增大,发包方收益和接包方努力水平也在提高,而固定收入、产出分享系数在减小。通过模型仿真也发现公平偏好程度并不是越大越好,过于频繁地采取相同的激励措施会降低激励效果。

In order to solve the incentive problem of principal-agent for multi task and multi-stage crowdsourcing innovation,a two-task two-stage principal-agent model was established based on the fairness preference theory.Analyzes the relationship between fairness preference and the level of agents'efforts,output sharing coefficient,fixed payments.The analysis shows that fairness preference has no effect on the two stages of crowdsourcing innovation when symmetric information.With the increase of fairness preference,the employer's income and the level of agents'efforts are increasing,while the fixed income and output sharing coefficient are decreasing when asymmetric information.It is also found that too often take incentive measures will reduce the incentive effect.