摘要
亚里士多德的《形而上学》Ζ卷以晦涩复杂而著名,研究者大多从亚里士多德哲学体系出发讨论问题,但这样做并不足以解释其中思想的矛盾之处,如《形而上学》Ζ7-8为什么没有提及人的第一实体灵魂,反而强调的是柏拉图的理念"人",却又在Ζ10-11对人有了重新定位并强调灵魂是人的第一实体。在我们看来,矛盾的缘由在于,Ζ卷的思想并非如传统所认为的是亚里士多德的成熟期思想,相反,Ζ7-11的论述表明,一方面,此时的亚里士多德尚在柏拉图的思想影响之下,更强调形式而非复合物是定义的对象,另一方面,也表明他在逐步突破老师的思想--把单纯的种概念扩充为普遍的质形复合物,又肯定了灵魂是人的第一实体,强调了灵魂的功能。因此,运用发生学方法,从人和灵魂的关系角度,《形而上学》Ζ卷的种和形式的普遍性问题将得以澄清。
Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book Z is famous for its obscurity and complexity.Most researchers discuss problems within the Aristotelian philosophical system,but it is not enough to explain the contradictions of his thought.For example,why does Z7-8 not mention soul,which is the primary substance of man,but emphasizes Plato’s idea of"man",while Metaphysics Z10-11 repositions the concept of man and emphasizes soul as the primary substance?According to the research,the reason for the contradiction is that the thought in Metaphysics Book Z is not the mature thought of Aristotle as traditionally believed.On the contrary,the discussion in Z7-11 shows:on the one hand,Aristotle is still under the influence of Plato’s thought,emphasizing that form is the object of definition rather than composite;on the other hand,he is gradually breaking through Plato’s thought--expanding the simple concept of species into a universal composite of form and matter,while affirming that soul is the primary substance of man,and emphasizing the function of soul.In this way,this article clarifies the universality of species and form in Book Z from the perspective of the relationship between man and soul.
作者
吕纯山
LYU Chunshan(Institute of European and American Cultural Philosophy,Tianjin Foreign Studies University,Tianjin 300204,China)
出处
《上饶师范学院学报》
2021年第4期1-11,19,共12页
Journal of Shangrao Normal University
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(15ZDB011)。
关键词
人
种
灵魂
形式
复合物
man
species
soul
form
composite