摘要
项目下乡中的精英俘获不仅包含精英人物对特定资源的占有,还包含精英地区对普通地区项目资源的挤占。精英俘获并不必然来源于制度缺陷或精英作恶,项目分配中的偶然初始选择、自我强化机制和成本收益考量是导致精英俘获的重要原因之一,其中制度隔离发挥了突出作用。这也解释了为何正式制度和国家权力对精英俘获的规训失效。
The elite capture in projects going to the countryside includes not only the possession of spe-cific resources by elites,but also the squeezing of project resources in ordinary areas by elite areas.Elite capture does not necessarily come from institutional defects or elite evil.Accidental initial selec-tion,self-reinforcing mechanism and cost-benefit consideration in project allocation are one of the im-portant reasons leading to elite capture.Among them,institutional isolation has played a prominentrole.This also explains why the formal system and state power are ineffective in the discipline of elitecapture.
作者
汤瑜
于水
TANG Yu;YU Shui(School of Public Policy and Administration,Xi'an Jiaotong University,Xi'an,Shaanxi 710049,China;School of Public Administration,Nanjing Agricultural University,Nanjing,Jiangsu 210095,China)
出处
《求实》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第5期97-108,112,共13页
Truth Seeking
关键词
乡村治理
项目下乡
精英俘获
偶然初始选择
自我强化机制
成本收益考量
rural governance
projects going to the countryside
elite capture
accidental initial selection
self-reinforcing mechanism
cost-benefit considerations