摘要
道德哲学领域存在着相互竞争的规范伦理立场,帕菲特认为导致这些分歧的根源在于对道德规范性认识的差异。要避免这些分歧导致道德虚无主义,需要对道德客观性进行重新审视。帕菲特反对基于欲望以及心理动机的道德主观主义,支持道德客观主义。他从个人同一性的客观视角出发,以客观理由和认知合理性为逻辑支撑,对道德哲学领域三大主流理论——康德义务论、斯坎伦契约论以及后果论进行改造,提出了三重理论以及最优原则。虽然帕菲特致力于提供客观道德规范准则,弥合道德分歧之间的鸿沟,但是他的思想具有局限性。道德客观性意味着某种程度上的规范性。帕菲特只强调了道德规范的理论维度,忽视了激发与实践维度。道德规范性与实践合理性之间存在极大张力。在道德实践中,不仅要以客观事实或价值为导向,更要权衡道德主体所面临的复杂境遇,通过适当的认知推理过程锻炼理性能力,从而成就真正重要之事。
There are competing normative positions in the field of moral philosophy.Parfit believes that the deeply rooted cause of these differences lies in the understanding of moral normativity.In order to avoid these differences leading to moral nihilism,it is a necessity to re-examine moral objectivity.Parfit opposes moral subjectivism based on desires and psychological motivations and supports moral objectivism.Starting from the objective viewpoint about personal identity and taking objective reasons and cognitive rationality as his logical support,he has reformed the three mainstream moral theories,namely,Kant’s Deontology,Scanlon’s Contractualism as well as Consequentialism,aimed at getting the Triple Theory and the Optimific Principle.Although Parfit is committed to providing us with objective moral norms and bridging the gaps among moral disagreements,his thoughts has certain limitations.Moral objectivity implies a certain degree of normativity.Parfit has emphasized the theoretical dimension of moral normativity,but neglected its motivational and practical dimensions.There is always a great tension between moral objectivity and practical rationality.In our moral practice,we must not only be guided by objective facts or values,but also weigh the complicated circumstances faced up by particular moral agents.By exercising rational reasoning capacity through appropriate cognitive processes,we can ultimately accomplish what is truly important.
作者
郑畅
任丑
Zheng Chang;Ren Chou
出处
《世界哲学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第5期125-136,F0003,共13页
World Philosophy
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“人类命运共同体视角下应用伦理学的逻辑结构与实践功能研究”(项目编号:18BZ124)
西南大学创新团队项目“脆弱性视域的中国传统德性与当代伦理重构”(项目编号:SWU1709111)
西南大学2019年中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目“艾丽丝·默多克的人性善恶与自由观”(项目编号:SWU1909531)的阶段性成果
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