地方政府化工企业安全监管的演化博弈分析——以江苏省响水“3·21”爆炸事故为例

Local Government’s Safety Supervision of Chemical Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Model:A Case Study of“3·21”Explosion Accident of Jiangsu Province

经济发展进入新常态,不仅增加了企业转型的阵痛,也带来了政府安全生产监管的动态失衡问题,由此导致监管低效,重大事故频发,影响社会稳定和政府公信力。以江苏响水“3·21”爆炸事故的监管失败为例,以有限理性行为假设为基础,运用演化博弈模型和利益分析方法,对政府与企业面临价值抉择与行为博弈从项目引入阶段—经营发展阶段—后事故阶段进行多维动态分析。研究发现:新常态下企业发展遇到成本上升和效益下滑的困境,企业基于盈利目标,在监管部门的宽松监管下存在追求超额收益的投机行为,容易选择消极管控和规避监管策略;地方政府在市场监管中,出于多重利益考量,对监管频度和力度会维持基本底线思维,并保持宽松监管策略,在动态博弈过程中导致监管流于形式。因此,政府安全监管博弈策略需要基于成本收益均衡的利益价值杠杆重构。

The new normal of economic development not only increases the pain of enterprise transformation,but also brings about the dynamic imbalance of government safety supervision.This leads to low efficiency of supervision and frequent occurrence of major accidents,affecting social stability and government credibility.This study gives a case study of the regulatory failure of Xiangshui“3·21”chemical explosion accident in Jiangsu province.Based on the assumption of rational behavior,using the evolutionary game model and the interest analysis method,a multi-dimensional dynamic analysis is conducted on the value choice and game tactics faced by the government and enterprises from the introduction stage to the operation and development stage and then to the post-accident stage of an investment project.The research finds that in the new normal,enterprises are faced with the dilemma of rising costs and declining benefits.Targeted towards profits,enterprises tend to speculate in pursuit of excess returns in the lax supervision of regulatory authorities,so they will choose negative tactics to avoid supervision.Due to multiple interests consideration,local governments will maintain the bottom-line frequency and intensity of supervision,and take the strategy of lax supervision,which leads to a mere formality of supervision in the dynamic game process.Therefore,the government should base its game strategies for safety regulation on reconstruction of cost-benefit balance.