地方政府纾困、融资成本与企业业绩分化

Local Governments'Financial Relief Policy,Financing Cost and Divergence of Corporate Performance

利用2014-2019年中国上市公司财务数据,以纾困前(2017年)上市公司股权质押率构建纾困强度变量,运用强度双重差分模型实证分析地方政府纾困和融资成本对上市公司业绩的影响。研究表明:(1)地方政府纾困显著降低了上市公司的业绩表现;(2)地方政府纾困效果会因上市公司是否与融资平台公司存在关联交易表现出明显差异,纾困显著提高了与融资平台公司存在关联交易的上市公司的业绩,但抑制非关联上市公司的业绩提升;(3)融资成本是地方政府纾困影响上市公司业绩的重要机制;(4)在市场化程度较高的地区,上述效果更明显。

This paper selects the relevant financial data of listed companies from 2014 to 2019 as a sample,uses the listed companies'equity pledge rate before the policy(2017)to build intensity variable,and uses intensity difference-in-difference model to empirically analyze the policy effects and mechanism of the policy for listed companies.The research results show:(1)The policy significantly reduced the performance of listed companies;(2)The effect of the policy varied significantly depending on whether listed companies have connected transactions with local financing platforms.The policy significantly improved the performance of listed companies that have connected transactions with financing platform companies,but reduced the performance of non-affiliated companies.(3)Financing cost is an important mechanism for local governments to relieve the performance of listed companies;(4)In regions with a higher degree of marketization,the above effects are more obvious.