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如何拯救正义?——论科恩与建构主义者之争

How to Rescue Justice?—Based on the Debates Between G.A.Cohen and Constructivists
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摘要 罗尔斯仿照康德的定言命令程序,设定了原初状态,由原初状态得到基本的正义原则。科恩批评罗尔斯的建构主义不但混淆了事实和规范、正义基本原则与调节规则,还使得正义概念无法界定,正义的理念更无从实现。建构主义者否认科恩的挑战,并给出如下理由:科恩与罗尔斯分别在规范性层面与方法论层面讨论元伦理学;科恩的终极道德原则是一种内在的事实敏感性原则;罗尔斯后期的政治建构主义不需要科恩从中拯救正义概念。从双方的争议中可以看到,无论是罗尔斯的建构主义,还是科恩所支持的运气均等主义正义原则,都无法摆脱对特定事实的预设,他们的正义理论之所以分道而行,主要是因为在“何种事实对于正义理论是必要的”这一问题上产生了分歧。从这个角度看,科恩与建构主义者的争论在一定意义上揭示出正义理论的局限性。 Following Kant′s categorical imperative procedure,Rawls sets the original position and obtains the fundamental principles of justice.But Cohen believes that Rawls′constructivism not only confuses the facts and norms,the fundamental principles of justice and the rules of regulation,but also makes the concept of justice impossible to define,and the ideal of justice not to be realized.However,constructivists hold the view that Cohen′s challenge is not successful.Firstly,they consider that the debates between the two lies in the discussion of meta-ethical questions in different levels,Cohen on normality level while Rawls on methodology level.Secondly,Cohen seems to endorse internally fact-sensitive fundamental principles in his ultimate ethics principle.Thirdly,the political constructivism of the late Rawls does not need Cohen to save the concept of justice from it.From both sides of the debate,both constructivism of Rawls and luck egalitarianism of Cohen can not get rid of fact presupposition.They separate mainly because they have disagreements on the opinions of"what kind of fact is necessary for a theory of justice".From this point of view,the debates between Cohen and constructivists reveals the limitation of the theory of justice in a certain sense.
作者 李毅琳 汪行福 Li Yilin;Wang Xingfu
出处 《中州学刊》 CSSCI 北大核心 2021年第9期115-122,共8页 Academic Journal of Zhongzhou
基金 国家社会科学基金重大项目“复杂现代性与中国发展之道”(15ZDB013)。
关键词 建构主义 正义 罗尔斯 G.A.科恩 constructivism justice Rawls G.A.Cohen
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