驳符合论的核心洞见

A Refutation of the Core Insight of Correspondence Theory of Truth

按照符合论的核心洞见,“真”的客观性被归结为使真者的独立性和命题与实在之间的符合关系。但是弗雷格的真值理论表明,符合关系对于确保“真”的客观性是多余的。在人类求真的认知活动中,符合论的核心洞见不仅不重要而且有害,因为它会使我们的求真活动落入完全客观性的认知陷阱。在追求客观“真”的过程中,人类实际上用于确立命题、信念和思想之“真”的方法是对其做出公共性的证明,而非诉诸某种独立存在于外部世界中的使真者,比如“事实”。作为一种符合论意义上的典型的使真者,外在的事实只能作为形而上学的幻象以满足人类对于完全客观性的不切实际的渴望。

According to the core insight of correspondence theory of truth(CTT),the objectivity of truth is reduced to the independence of truth-makers and the correspondence between propositions and reality constituted of these truth-makers.However,Frege’s theory of truth value has been used to show that the correspondence is redundant for the objectivity of truth.In human’s activities of pursuit of objective truths,the core insight of CTT is not only dispensable but also destructive,because it can derive our activities of pursuing truth into a cognitive trap of the complete objectivity.During the pursuit of objective truths,the only thing that human can do to establish a sentence,a belief or a thought as true,is to give a collective proof of it,rather than to appeal for truth-makers existing in the external world independently of mind,e.g.facts.The only role of externally existing facts that they can play,as a typical sort of truth-makers in the sense of correspondence theory,is to satisfy human’s unreasonable desire of complete objectivity as a metaphysical illusion.