为什么团队与个人决策存在差异?--基于团队内成员互动的解释

Why Might Groups’Decisions Differ from Individuals’?——Investigation Based on Inter-member Interaction

本文基于两类分配博弈实验来研究团队内的成员互动,结果表明,在团队成员互动之前,个人偏好对形成成员的初始提议具有重要作用,但其他因素也可能使初始提议偏向不同的方向。在团队互动过程中,我们发现了支持中间选民理论和说服论据理论的证据,即上一轮的中位提议和自私提议会影响本轮的提议。亲社会信息对提议没有影响,且提议行为也不随决策轮次增加而向更亲社会方向变化,故社会比较理论未被证实。中位提议和自私提议的影响会随团队内的互动程度而改变,互动程度高的团队所形成的最终决策的随机性更大。本文为打开团队决策中成员互动的"黑箱"提供了证据,并且解释了以往研究中普遍发现的团队行为往往比个人行为表现得更理性、更自私的现象。

We use two allocation games to study inter-member interaction in small groups.We find that before the interaction for group decision-making,individual preference is important to form initial group proposals,but various factors could shape initial proposals toward different direction.During the interaction,there exists evidence supporting median voter theorem and persuasive argument theory.However,social comparison theory is not supported.We also find that the influences of median and selfish proposals varies with groups’degree of interaction thereby resulting in more randomized formation of final group decisions.