摘要
基于中国工业企业数据,本文考察了在行政干预风险下外商投资是否更为青睐与国有企业进行合资,以此来构建紧密的政企关系进而规避投资风险。研究发现,地区行政干预程度越为严重,外资在进入中国市场时越倾向于选择合资形式,而且更有意愿与国有企业进行合资。与国有企业合资现象在高契约密集度行业表现得尤为突出;进一步考虑了外资来源地、外商股权份额以及引资政策调整等情形,基本结论都较为稳健。
Based on Chinese industrial enterprises data,we examine whether foreign investment is more likely to be joint ventures with state-owned enterprises under the risk of administrative intervention,in order to build a close relationship between government and enterprises and avoid investment risks.We find that the more serious regional political intervention is,the more likely foreign investors choose joint ventures,especially establishing ventures with state-owned enterprises.The effect of political intervention on partner choice becomes more significant among contract-intensive industries,and remain robust by considering source of foreign investors,share structure of joint ventures and the adjustment of foreign investment policies.
作者
包群
梁贺
阳佳余
QUN BAO;JIAYU YANG;HE LIANG(Nankai University;Tianjin University of Finance and Economics)
出处
《经济学(季刊)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第4期1477-1498,共22页
China Economic Quarterly
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71973073)
国家社会科学基金重点课题(21AZD024)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金的资助。
关键词
行政干预
所有制差异
合资对象选择
administrative intervention
ownership differences
joint venture partner selection