企业内控质量与分析师外部治理作用的有效性

Enterprise Internal Control Quality and the Effectiveness of Analyst’s External Governance Function

证券市场的注册制改革凸显了分析师外部治理作用的重要性,文献提示分析师治理作用存在悖论问题,但如何解释、解决该问题尚缺乏研究。该文从信息生产视角解析了悖论产生的根源在于不同渠道上机会主义行为治理所要求的信息生产效率不同,导致分析师关注的监督效应与诱导效应有不同对比关系;文章进一步论证了企业内控质量对分析师信息生产效率有外溢影响,可产生内外部治理协同性。基于我国A股样本的实证证明了分析师关注的差异性影响,而内控质量可起到调节作用,尤其是抑制诱导效应,改善对费用操纵、过度投资行为的治理效果。该结果首次表明分析师治理作用悖论可以得到协调,并在实践上启示分析师评估预测时应将内控质量作为关键权重。

The recent reform of Chinese securities market highlights the importance of analysts’external governance.Literature suggests a paradox in analysts’governance role,but how to explain and solve the problem is still lack of research.From the perspective of information production,this paper points out that the root of the paradox lies in the different efficiency requirement of information production for coping with different opportunistic behavior,which leads to different outcomes of analysts’coverage.This paper further demonstrates that the quality of internal control has spillover effect on the efficiency of analyst information production,which can produce internal and external governance synergy.Based on the sample of listed companies in China A-share market,this paper proves the existence of different effectiveness of analysts’governance function in different opportunistic behavior channels,and the quality of companies’internal control plays a mediation role,i.e.,to inhibit the inducement effect,and to enhance the governance effect on decreasing opportunistic behaviors such as cost manipulation and over investment.For the first time,the results show that the paradox of analysts’governance role can be coordinated,and provides implication for securities analyzing practitioners to take internal control quality as a key factor.