控股股东股权质押、融资约束与企业创新

Controlling Shareholders Equity Pledge,Financing Constraints and Enterprise Innovation

通过选取2013—2018年中国724家创业板上市公司年度数据,构建面板回归模型对控股股东股权质押对企业创新的影响及其异质性特征进行了实证分析,并进一步考察了融资约束的中介作用及企业风险承担与金融环境的调节作用。研究结果表明:控股股东股权质押对企业创新具有抑制作用,控股股东股权质押比率的提高会加大对企业创新的抑制力度。控股股东股权质押对企业创新的抑制作用存在异质性特征,相对于国有产权与高投资倾向企业,控股股东股权质押对非国有产权与低投资倾向企业创新的抑制力度更大。融资约束在控股股东股权质押与企业创新的关系中承担着中介作用,控股股东股权质押会加剧企业融资约束程度,由此引发企业研发投入下降,从而抑制企业创新,“控股股东股权质押-融资约束-企业创新”的传导渠道有效。企业风险承担对控股股东股权质押与企业创新的关系具有负向调节作用,企业风险承担水平提高会减弱控股股东股权质押对企业创新的抑制作用,这主要归于企业创新风险容忍度提升所带来的预期高回报效应。金融环境对控股股东股权质押与企业创新的关系具有正向调节作用,金融环境提升会加大企业融资约束与控制权转移风险,由此加剧控股股东股权质押对企业创新的抑制作用。该研究成果将为提升中国企业创新质量及实现中国经济高质量发展,提供重要的理论指导与决策参考。

Give an empirical research on influence of controlling shareholder’s share pledge on enterprise innovation as well as its heterogeneity character by using annual data of 724 Gem listed companies in China from 2013 to 2018,and futher approach on intermediary effect of financing constraints and moderate effect of enterprise risk-taking and financial environment.The results show that:The pledge of controlling shareholder’s equity has a restraining effect on corporate innovation,and the increase in the ratio of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge will increase the restraint of corporate innovation.Controlling shareholder’s equity pledge has heterogeneous characteristics in inhibiting corporate innovation.Compared with state-owned property rights and high investment propensity enterprises,controlling shareholder’s equity pledge restrains the innovation of non-state-owned property rights and low investment propensity enterprises more.Financing constraints play an intermediary role in the relationship between controlling shareholder’s equity pledge and corporate innovation.The controlling shareholder’s equity pledge will intensify the degree of corporate financing constraints,which will lead to a decline in corporate R&D investment,thereby inhibiting corporate innovation.Controlling shareholder equity pledge-financing constraints-The transmission channel of“enterprise innovation”is effective.Corporate risk-taking has a negative regulatory effect on the relationship between controlling shareholder’s equity pledge and corporate innovation.Increased corporate risk-taking level will weaken the inhibitory effect of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on corporate innovation.It is mainly due to the expected high return with the increase in corporate innovation risk tolerance.The financial environment has a positive regulatory effect on the relationship between controlling shareholder’s equity pledge and corporate innovation.The improvement of the financial environment will increase corporate financing constraints and the risk of control transfer,thereby intensifying the inhibitory effect of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on corporate innovation.The research results will provide important theoretical guidance and decision-making reference for improving the innovation quality of Chinese enterprises and realizing the high-quality development of China’s economy.