封闭公司实行合伙制股权激励的制度困境及其纾解--兼论混合型商业组织的治理逻辑

The Institutional Dilemma and Solution of Equity Incentive in Partnership in Closed Companies-On the Governance Logic of Mixed Business Organization

传统理论认为通过股权激励的方式可以降低封闭公司因两权分立而产生的代理成本,但是频频发生的司法争端却不断挑战着这一理论假说。究其缘由,“封闭公司+有限合伙”的组织形式,改变了传统企业的信息分布和利益结构,催生了控股股东与激励对象之间的第二类代理成本。与此同时,上述结构性变迁,还导致强制分红、强制退出以及除名行动等,曾经作用于相似组织结构的传统治理机制纷纷失效。因此,重拾《合伙企业法》中长期被忽略的人数限制、薪酬激励等制度规则,成为优化合伙制持股模式的必然选择。推而广之,混合型商业组织的治理逻辑,应当以特定的信息分布和利益结构为基础,反思并重构以单一型企业为基本假设的传统治理框架。

The traditional theory holds that equity incentive can reduce the agency cost caused by the separation of two powers in a closed company,but the frequent judicial disputes challenge this theoretical hypothesis.The reason is that the organizational form of“closed company&limited partnership”has changed the information distribution and interest structure of traditional enterprises,resulting in the second kind of agency cost between controlling shareholders and incentive objects.In addition,the traditional governance tools that once acted on similar organizational structures,such as compulsory dividend,forced exit and delisting action,also failed due to the above structural changes.Therefore,it is an inevitable choice to optimize the shareholding mode of the partnership system to regain the long neglected system rules such as the number limit and salary incentive in the Partnership Enterprise Law.In a word,the governance logic of mixed business organizations should be based on the specific information distribution and interest structure,reflect and reconstruct the traditional governance framework based on the assumption of single enterprise.