政府隐性担保、市场化进程与信贷配置效率

Implicit Government Guarantee,Marketization Process and Credit Allocation Efficiency

本文基于默顿(Merton)期权定价公式,创新性地构建政府隐性担保指标,并以2007-2019年非金融上市公司为样本,深入剖析政府隐性担保对信贷配置效率的影响。研究发现,政府隐性担保提升了信贷数量配置效率以及信贷价格配置效率,前者在高盈利企业中更为明显,后者在高盈利、低成长以及国有企业中更加显著。进一步,从纾解企业"融资难"视角看,政府隐性担保掣肘了市场机制的作用;而从改善企业"融资贵"的角度看,在市场化程度较低的地区,政府隐性担保可以作为市场机制的补充。据此,在经济遭受负面冲击的时期以及市场化程度较低的地区,政府隐性担保能够弥补市场机制的不足;随着经济全面复苏以及各地区市场化进程的纵深推进,可逐步弱化政府隐性担保,以使市场在信贷配置中发挥主导作用。

Based on Merton option pricing formula,this thesis constructs a novel implicit government guarantee index,and analyzes the influence of implicit government guarantee on the efficiency of credit allocation using the data of China’s non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2019.The study found that implicit government guarantee can not only improve the credit allocation efficiency in quantity,but also improve the credit allocation efficiency in price.The former is more obvious in high-profit enterprises,the latter is more significant in high profit,low growth and state-owned enterprises.Furthermore,from the perspective of alleviating the“financing difficulties”of enterprises,implicit government guarantee has disturbed the mechanism of market;From the perspective of improving the“expensive financing”of enterprises,implicit government guarantee supplemented the market mechanism,but it only occurred in provinces with low degree of marketization.In view of this,in the period of negative shock and in provinces with low degree of marketization,implicit government guarantee effectively makes up for the deficiency of the market;In the long run,with the economic recovery and the deepening of the marketization process,implicit government guarantee should gradually withdraw,so that the market can play a leading role in credit allocation.