反本质主义意识论与僵尸主义论证

Conscious Inessentialism and Zombist Arguments

意识本质论在笛卡尔之“我思”的形而上的构建中占据着核心地位,而笛卡尔循环无疑强化了它在认识论、知识论中的基础地位。但是,异己现象学作为一种整合自然科学知识的科学方法论,提出意识的因果怀疑论,即意识在人类长期的进化中并无发挥适应环境的因果作用。弗拉纳根由此从僵尸主义者视角提出反本质主义意识论论证,指出意识并非人类据以理性思考与行动的本质。查莫斯把僵尸论证从形而上或概念的层面外推于逻辑可能性,使之成为超越心身问题的宇宙论问题,结果加剧了意识自然化的难度。因为意识要么陷入认知神秘主义泥淖,要么是副现象论,由此考量着自然主义的理论极限。

Conscious essentialism is critical to the metaphysical construction of Descartes’“cogito”.Undoubtedly,it works as the foundation of epistemology and knowledge,which has been effectively justified by Cartesian cycle.Heterophenomenology,as a scientific methodology synthesizing a variety of knowledge of natural sciences of consciousness,nonetheless,proposes a causal scepticism of conscious essentialism,which means that possibility of consciousness has not played a causal role in terms of adapting to environment in the long-term evolution of human beings.In light of the zombist view,Flanagan thus presented an argument for conscious inessentialism,claiming that consciousness could not constitute the essence of human rational thoughts and actions.This type of zombist argument was extrapolated from the metaphysical concepts by Chalmers to the logical possibility,making it as a cosmological problem,thus increasing the difficulties of naturalizing the consciousness.That is to say,it would result in the dual unacceptable consequences,namely,falling in the dilemma of cognitive mysticism or epiphenomenalism,which in turn examines the theoretical limits of naturalism.