地方政府隐性债务与银行流动性创造

Local Government Implicit Debt and Bank Liquidity Creation

目前大量文献研究政府债务对经济增长和资金需求方企业经营的影响,但缺乏对资金供给方银行行为影响的研究。本文使用2005—2017年中国147家地方银行数据,考察地方政府隐性债务与银行流动性创造之间的关系。结果表明:(1)地方政府隐性债务扩张会抑制银行流动性创造,对实体经济增长产生负面影响。一系列的稳健性检验和内生性分析均证明本文结论是可靠的。(2)中介效应表明,地方政府隐性债务通过信贷资源挤出效应对银行流动性创造产生抑制作用。(3)异质性分析发现,随着地方政府隐性债务规模的持续扩张,上市银行、农村商业银行均会增加流动性创造,政府部门作为大股东的银行会减少流动性创造。(4)调节效应表明,在地方政府隐性债务较低地区或产权制度环境较好地区的银行以及在地方债置换时期的银行,随着地方政府隐性债务扩张均会创造更多的流动性。

A large literature exists on the impact of government debt on economic growth and enterprise operation,but there is a lack of literature on the impact on bank behavior.This paper examines the relationship between local government implicit debt and bank liquidity creation using the data of 147 local banks in China from 2005-2017.The results show that:(1)the expansion of local government implicit debt inhibits bank liquidity creation,and has a negative impact on the real economy growth.A series of robustness tests and endogeneity analyses prove that the findings of this paper are reliable.(2)The intermediation effect suggests that local government implicit debt has a dampening effect on bank liquidity creation by the crowding out effect of bank credit resources.(3)Heterogeneity analysis finds that with the continuous expansion of local government implicit debt,listed banks and rural commercial banks increase liquidity creation,and banks with government department as the top shareholder reduce liquidity creation.(4)The moderating effect suggests that banks in areas with lower government debt or better property rights system environment,as well as banks in the replacement period of local government implicit debt,create more liquidity with the expansion of local government implicit debt.