国有企业治理中国有产权代表制度改革再研究——侧重股东大会和公众治理的角度

Restudy on the Reform of Representative System of State-owned Property Rights in the Governance of State-owned Enterprises——Focus on the Perspective of the General Meeting of Shareholders and Public Governance

现行负责国有资产监管的国有产权代表治理效能较低,关键原因在于国有产权代表没有公众及其代表而仅有代理人即专职管理者,同时国有产权代表和股东大会的制度及其实施也存在缺陷。包括职工在内的公众作为产权代表直接参与监管,是国有经济建立高效监督制约体系、实现持续健康发展的必要保证,从而是发展社会主义事业和坚持共产党领导的长久保障,这也是公有制人民群众所有权的要求。国有企业以马列主义中国特色社会主义民主管理原则为依据,超越传统的委托-代理模式,建立以所有者(股东)大会为中心的公众及其代表、职工及其代表、专职国有股权代表三元代表治理体制,是可行的,也一定能够克服专职国有产权代表的局限性。

The governance efficiency of the current state-owned property representatives responsible for the supervision of state-owned assets is low. The key reason is that the state-owned property representatives do not include the public and their representatives,but only agents,that is,full-time managers. At the same time,there are also defects in the system and the implementation of the state-owned property representatives and the general meeting of shareholders. The direct participation of the public,including staff,as representatives of property rights,is a necessary guarantee for the establishment of an efficient supervision and balance system and the realization of sustainable and healthy development of the state-owned economy. It is also a long-term guarantee for the development of the socialist cause and the adherence to the leadership of the Communist Party. It is also the requirement of the public ownership of the people. Based on the democratic management principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialism with Chinese characteristics,it is feasible for state-owned enterprises to surpass the traditional principal-agent model and establish a ternary representative governance system centered on the owner’s( shareholder’s) general meeting,the public and its representatives,the employees and their representatives,and the full-time state-owned equity representatives. It will also overcome the limitations of full-time state-owned property rights representatives.