股权众筹投资人竞拍报价策略是否影响融资绩效?

Does the Bidding Strategy for the Valuation of Equity Crowdfunding Projects Affect Financing Performance?--Based on SIPV Model Analysis and Data Verification

股权众筹成为"疫情"下中小微企业融资难问题破解的有效途径。投资人在获得高额回报的同时,也承担巨大风险,而领投-跟投模式和信息披露机制对股权众筹的风险规避有关键作用,但该模式下投资人对项目的竞拍报价策略是否会影响到融资绩效还有待深入研究。针对该问题,建立基于SIPV的股权众筹线上竞拍模型,利用博弈、最优化方法分析投资人项目估值竞拍最优报价策略,并对"大家投"网站进行实证分析。结果显示了在领投-跟投模式下,股权众筹投资人项目估值竞拍报价策略对项目融资绩效有正向影响;可提出在经济低迷期,中小微企业通过股权众筹模式获得资金的稳定支持的对策措施。"大家投"网站失败与其融资模式无关。

Equity crowdfunding has become an effective way to solve the financing problems of small and medium-sized enterprises under the epidemic situation. Equity crowdfunding investors not only get high returns,but also take huge risks. However, the information disclosure mechanism under the lead-follow-up mode plays a key role in risk avoidance of equity crowdfunding, but whether investors’ bidding strategies for projects under this mode will affect financing performance remains to be further studied. To solve this problem, the online auction model of equity crowdfunding based on SIPV is established, and the optimal bidding strategy of investors’ project valuation auction is analyzed by using the game and optimization methods, and the website of "Dajiatou"is empirically analyzed. The results show that under the lead-follow-up mode, the bidding strategy of equity crowdfunding investors’ project valuation has a positive impact on project financing performance;In the economic downturn, this paper puts forward some countermeasures for small and medium-sized enterprises to obtain stable financial support through equity crowdfunding mode, and explains that the failure of"Dajiatou"website has nothing to do with its financing mode.