摘要
以双边平台的竞争模型为基本框架,考虑双边平台具有的交叉网络外部性和双边用户归属,构建了双寡头平台的商家和消费者决策模型,通过对比独家交易发生前后的消费者规模、平台利润、商家和消费者效用,发现具有市场支配地位的平台通过实施独家交易可使其市场支配地位增强、利润增加,但消费者和商家效用随之降低。反垄断行政执法机构和法院应加强对互联网平台独家交易等垄断行为的反垄断执法力度;对受到竞争损害的平台、商家和消费者存在的举证困难问题,法院可考虑实施举证责任倒置。
Taking the competition model of bilateral platforms as the basic framework,considering the cross network externalities and bilateral user ownership of bilateral platforms,this paper constructs the merchant and consumer decision-making model of duopoly platforms.By comparing the consumer scale,platform profit,merchant and consumer utility before and after exclusive transactions,It is found that the platform with market dominance enhances its market dominance and profits through the implementation of exclusive trading,but the utility of consumers and merchants decreases.The anti-monopoly administrative law enforcement agencies and courts should strengthen the anti-monopoly law enforcement of monopolistic acts such as exclusive transactions on Internet platforms.For the difficulty of proof of platforms,businesses and consumers damaged by competition,the court should consider the inversion of the burden of proof.
作者
于左
张芝秀
王昊哲
YU Zuo;ZHANG Zhi-xiu;WANG Hao-zhe
出处
《改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第10期131-144,共14页
Reform
基金
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“中国产业转型升级的轨迹和理论创新”(18JJD790002)。
关键词
平台竞争
双边市场
交叉网络外部性
独家交易
反垄断
platform competition
two-sided markets
cross network externality
exclusive dealing
antitrust