摘要
基于谦卑型领导自我超越和避免过度自信的竞争性视角,探讨具有谦卑行为的董事会如何影响企业战略风险承担。利用730家在沪深A股上市的制造业企业作为样本,研究发现:谦卑型董事会促进了企业风险承担,且通过选择激进型战略实现,体现了谦卑型董事会具有自我超越的意愿,而非避免过度自信;随着董事会非正式层级的清晰化,战略激进度的中介作用得以增强。进一步区分产权性质发现,谦卑型董事会对企业战略风险承担的影响机制只在非国有企业中存在,在国有企业中并不明显。
Based on the perspective of self-transcendence and avoiding overconfidence of humble leaders,we study how the humble board influences the strategic risk taking of enterprises using the data from 730 manufacturing enterprises listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares.The results show that the humble board promotes risk taking through choosing radical strategy,which indicates the willingness of the humble board to transcend itself rather than avoid overconfidence.As the informal hierarchy of the board becomes clear,the mediating effect of strategic radicalization is further enhanced.After distinguishing the nature of property right,we find the effect mechanism of the humble board on strategic risk taking is significant in non-state-owned enterprises instead of state-owned enterprises.
作者
张金涛
雷星晖
苏涛永
ZHANG Jintao;LEI Xinghui;SU Taoyong(Tongji University,Shanghai,China)
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第9期1287-1295,共9页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71872128)
上海市哲学社会科学规划基金资助青年项目(2019EGL008)。
