政府审计与国有企业金融化

Government Auditing and SOEs’Financialization

本文采用多时点双重差分模型检验了政府审计对国有企业金融化的影响。研究发现,政府审计显著地降低了国有企业金融化。进一步研究表明,政府审计主要通过抑制企业投机性金融资产以降低国有企业金融化;研究还发现,当地区监管力度越大、公司内部控制水平较低和外部审计师为非"四大"时,政府审计治理功能越显著;在经济后果上,研究发现政府审计促进国有企业降低金融化后,国有企业会显著地提高对实体资本投资和创新研发投入。研究发现为有效预防国有企业"脱实向虚"行为提供了微观层面证据,也为深化政府审计研究提供了理论与经验支持。

This paper studies the impacts of the implementation of government audit promulgated by the Audit Commission on SOEs’financialization using the Difference-in-Difference model.The results suggest that government audits can effectively constrain SOEs’financialization.Further study shows that government audits decrease corporate financialization by reducing speculative financial investment significantly.We also note that the effects of government audits are more pronounced when firms locate in areas with more strict public supervision,have lower internal control quality and receive audit service by accounting firms other than the"Big Four".Regarding to economic consequences,we find that government audits can increase physical capital investment and R&D input significantly when decreasing financial investment.This study provides evidence for government oversight preventing corporations being distracted from their physical business effectively,as well as providing theoretical support and empirical evidence for further study about government audit.