不同权力结构和联盟策略下风险规避型闭环供应链决策

Study on Decisions of A Closed-loop Supply Chain with Risk Aversion under Different Power Structures and Alliance Strategies

本文旨在探讨不同渠道权力结构和联盟策略下风险规避型闭环供应链的决策问题。考虑到产品需求和废旧产品回收的不确定性及决策者的风险规避特性,在制造商主导、零售商主导及制造商和零售商势力均衡三种情形下,分别构建了制造商和零售商联盟与不联盟时的闭环供应链博弈模型,获得了六个博弈模型下的均衡解,对比分析了不同模型下产品定价、废旧产品的最优回收价格和供应链及其成员的期望收益。研究结果表明,在制造商和零售商不联盟的情形下,决策者的风险规避程度增加能够缓解双重边际效应,供应链期望收益与风险规避程度正相关,而在制造商和零售商联盟的情形下,供应链期望收益与风险规避程度负相关;制造商和零售商不联盟时,制造商和零售商势力均衡的渠道权力结构对消费者最有利,而制造商和零售商联盟时,制造商和零售商势力均衡的渠道权力结构对消费者最不利;制造商和零售商权力结构不对等时最优价格决策之间的关系与制造商和零售商的风险规避程度有关;供应链期望收益在制造商和零售商势力均衡下最大,制造商期望收益在制造商主导的渠道权力结构下最大,零售商期望收益在零售商主导的渠道权力结构下最大。

In a closed-loop supply chain,the members are exposed to both product demand and recycling uncertainties.At this time,most decision makers will avoid risk and consider risk factors when making decisions.In addition,the channel leaders’ attitude towards risk can strongly affect their followers.Based on existing business practices,the optimal pricing decision and performance of the risk-averse closedloop supply chain are studied under the power structure of manufacturer-led,retailer-led,and manufacturer-retailer power balance.Then,the optimal decision under alliance and non-aligned situation between the manufacturer and the retailer is influenced by the risk-averse characteristic of channel leader,which is different under different channel power structure.Therefore,a comparative analysis is also made on the influence of risk aversion degree on closed-loop supply chain decisions and expected revenue under different channel power structures and alliance strategies.In the construction of the models,firstly,the random variable is used to describe the market demand of new products and the recycling quantity of used products,and the exponential function is used to measure the utility of risk-averse decision makers.Then,the closed-loop supply chain game models of manufacturer and retailer alliance and non-alliance are constructed respectively under the three situations of manufacturer-led,manufacturer and retailer power balance and retailer-led.Finally,the Nash equilibrium game is used to solve the manufacturer-retailer power balance model and the Stakelberg game and the inverse induction method is used to solve the manufacturer-led and retailer-led models.By comparing the equilibrium solutions under the six models,the research conclusions are as follows:(1)When the manufacturer and retailer are not affiliated,their risk aversion coefficients have the same effect on optimal decisions.(2)When the manufacturer and retailer are not in alliance,the balanced power structure is the best for consumers;while when the manufacturer and retailer are in alliance,the balanced channel power structure is the most disadvantageous for consumers.(3)Under the uncertain market demand and recycling environment,the active price strategy can bring higher returns for the closed-loop supply chain when the manufacturer and retailer are in alliance,while the conservative price strategy can bring higher returns for the closed-loop supply chain when manufacturers and retailers are not in alliance.(4)The expected return of supply chain is the largest under the balanced power structure,the expected return of manufacturer is the largest under the power structure dominated by manufacturers,and the expected return of retailer is the largest under the power structure dominated by retailers.