高管机会主义品行与公司信息披露决策

Executive Opportunism and Corporate Information Disclosure

文章构建相应策略识别了高管机会主义品行,并探究其对公司信息披露决策的影响。研究结果表明,高管的机会主义品行会显著增加公司信息披露违规、真实盈余管理行为;提升公司选择非国际"四大"会计师事务所的概率,并支付更高的审计费用。随着高管机会主义水平上升,公司更有可能作出上述决策。进一步地,国有产权能在一定程度上抑制高管机会主义品行对信息披露质量的负面影响,却显著增加了公司应计盈余管理;当高管机会主义水平较高时,国有产权也无法发挥有效治理作用。从经济后果看,高管的机会主义品行能被资本市场识别,并显著减损公司未来价值。

This paper constructs strategies to identify the executive's characteristics of opportunism and explore its influence on corporate information disclosure.We find that the core opportunistic executives will significantly increase the probability of information disclosure violation and the level of real earnings management,and they are more likely to choose non-international"Big Four"accounting firms,and pay higher audit fees.The higher the level of opportunism,the more likely these behaviors are to be found.Further research shows that state-owned property rights can effectively restrain the influence of core opportunistic executives on information disclosure quality,but it prompts opportunistic executives to adopt more accrual earnings management strategies.The state-owned property rights are difficult to play an effective role as a constraint with the rising of the opportunism level.From the perspective of economic consequences,core opportunistic executives can be identified by the capital market,and significantly reduces the future value of the company.