金融官员与地方政府隐性债务风险:抑制还是提升——来自289个地级市的经验证据

Can Officials with Financial Background Promote the Governance of Local Government Debt Risk?Empirical Evidence from 289 Cities

文章基于2009-2018年289个地级市数据样本,结合“烙印理论”,考察了金融官员对地方政府隐性债务风险的具体效应及其作用机理。研究发现,相对于非金融官员,金融官员能显著地抑制地方政府隐性债务风险,表现为“治理效应”。进一步研究表明,巡视未覆盖地区、地区金融生态环境越佳和制度环境越好时,金融官员抑制地方政府隐性债务风险效果越明显。文章实证分析了官员的金融经历对地方隐性债务风险的作用机理及具体效应,有效地诠释了“金融副省长现象”,为金融干部队伍建设和金融监管提供理论解释与经验证据支持,也为现阶段防范化解重大风险攻坚战提供了启示。

This paper interprets the phenomenon of“VICE GOVERNOR OF FINANCE”and has provided theoretical explanation and empirical evidence supporting for it.Based on 289 cities data from 2009 to 2018,this paper examines the impact of officials with financial background on local government debt risk for the first time.We have found that officials with financial background can significantly reduce local government debt risk.Further research shows that untoured areas,better financial ecological environment and better institutional environment can produce more significant effect on reducing local government debt risk.The conclusion of this paper enriches the research on the characteristics of officials and local government debt risk,interprets the phenomenon of“VICE GOVERNOR OF FINANCE”effectively,extends the research on the impact of compound talents to the frame of government governance,provides empirical evidence support for the appointment of high-level officials with financial background by the state,and provides enlightenment for the prevention and resolution of major risks at this stage.