摘要
公司作为营利性组织,纳税是公司的法定义务,避税则是公司的天然动机。近年来,战略管理领域的研究发现,公司战略定位会影响避税策略,并导致诸多代理问题。独立审计作为公司外部治理的重要机制之一,能否对公司战略性避税行为发挥应有的监督作用,尤其是在中国审计市场激烈竞争与弱监管并存环境下,这是一个值得思考的问题。基于审计治理视角,实证检验外部审计对公司战略性避税行为的治理效应及其作用机制,考察公司战略性避税行为的路径合法性及其经济后果。以2009年至2016年中国沪深A股公司为样本,运用Stata 15.0进行多元回归分析,构建Heckman两阶段模型和处理效应模型缓解内生性问题,保证结论稳健性。研究结果表明,公司战略越激进,避税程度越高;但具备行业财税知识专长的审计专家并未迎合公司战略性避税行为,而是发挥了显著的监督效应,有效抑制了激进战略公司的激进避税行为。在拓展研究中,(1)对公司避税路径的合法性分析表明,激进战略公司的非法逃税程度更高,但审计专家有效抑制了此类非法避税行为;(2)对审计专家监督效应的约束机制分析表明,基于"客-师-所"三维度考察发现,发挥审计专家的监督效应主要取决于不同客户业务下的审计独立性;(3)对公司避税的经济后果分析表明,激进战略公司的激进避税行为能够提升当期公司价值,但会增加公司经营风险,降低财务报告信息质量。通过考察外部审计对公司战略性避税行为的治理作用,揭示审计专家的积极监督效应,并且在三维度厘清了审计治理作用的约束机制,提供外部审计参与公司财税决策监督的经验证据,弥补该领域的研究缺欠;通过考察公司战略性避税行为的路径合法性及其产生的利弊糅合的经济后果,帮助投资者和监管者深入解读公司战略性避税行为及其结果,以完善监管政策,提高税收征管效率。
As a profit-making organization,though paying taxes is the legal duty of the corporate,and tax evasion is thus the natural motivation of the corporate.In recent years,the research in the domain of strategic management has found that the strategic positioning of the enterprise will exert important influence on the tax evasion tactics,and give rise to a series of agency problems.As one of the vital mechanisms of the external governance of the corporate,whether the independent audit can play its due supervisory role in the strategic tax evasion behavior of the corporate,especially under the tough environment of fierce competition and"weak supervision"in the audit market in China,this is a question worthy to be researched.Based on the perspective of audit governance,the study empirically examines the governance effect and mechanism of external audit on corporate strategic tax evasion behavior,and verifies the path legitimacy and economic consequences of corporate strategic tax evasion behavior.Taking A-share non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2016 as the research sample,software stata15.0 was therefore applied to not only carry out multiple regression analysis,but also construct Heckman double-staged model and treatment effect model to alleviate endogenous problems and ensure the robustness of research conclusions.The research results show as followings:(1)the more radical the corporate strategy,the higher the degree of tax evasion.However,the audit experts with the expertise of industry finance and taxation do not cater to the strategic tax evasion behavior of the corporate,but play a significant supervision effect,which effectively suppresses the radical tax evasion behavior of the radical strategic corporate.(2)In the supplement research:(1)Judging from the validity analysis of the legitimacy of the tax evasion channel of the corporate,radical strategic corporate has a higher degree of illegal tax evasion,which is fundamentally curbed by audit experts;(2)In the analysis of constraint mechanism of audit expert supervision effect,on the basis of the three-dimensional study of"client-auditor-audit firm",it is found that the performance of audit expert supervision effect mainly depends on the independence of audit under different client business;(3)Concerning the analysis of the economic consequences of corporate tax evasion,radical tax evasion behavior of radical strategic corporate can enhance the value of the current corporate,coupled with the increase risk of the corporate business and the reduction of the quality of financial reporting information.The conspicuous investigation on the governance effect of external audit on the corporate strategic tax evasion behavior has revealed the positive supervision effect of the audit experts,and clarified the constraint mechanism of the audit government role in three dimension.Meanwhile it has also provided empirical evidence of external audit participation in the supervision of corporate fiscal and taxation decisions,and made up for the lack of research in this field;Simultaneously,by investigating the legitimacy of the corporate strategic tax evasion behavior and the economic consequences of the mixture of advantages and disadvantages,it contributes investors and regulators to deeply understand the corporate strategic tax evasion behavior and its results,so as to perfect the supervision policy and improve the efficiency of tax collection and management.
作者
闫焕民
李瑶瑶
廖佳
YAN Huanmin;LI Yaoyao;LIAO Jia(School of Economics&Management,Nanchang University,Nanchang 330031,China;School of Economics,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China)
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第3期120-134,共15页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(71662021,72062020,71962018)。
关键词
公司战略
避税行为
审计专家
监督效应
审计治理
corporate strategy
tax evasion behavior
audit experts
supervision effect
audit governance