反向业绩承诺的并购交易缘何得以发生--基于西部资源案例的公司治理分析

How Could an M&A Transaction with Reverse Performance Commitment Happen?A Case Study of Corporate Governance in Western Resources Holding Co.,Ltd

为保障主并方的合法权益,被并方通常会对主并方做出业绩承诺,而鲜有主并方对被并方的原股东做出针对被并方业绩的承诺(即反向业绩承诺)。本文剖析了近年来中国资本市场一则反向业绩承诺案例的前因与后果。从前因观察:(1)案例中的业绩承诺在方向、金额及生效条件上均具有异常性,但市场投资者在监管机构发布审核结果之前并未有效识别利益侵害风险;(2)监管审批制度能够识别并否决反向业绩承诺,但监管重心由事前转为事中、事后的制度变迁使公司可通过自行表决绕开这一限制,交易所也关注到反常交易,但问询后未见遏制措施;(3)分析师、媒体、审计师等市场中介以及股东大会、董事会等内部治理机制均未遏制反向业绩承诺的达成。从后果观察:并购交易完成后,被并方实现的业绩与之前的承诺差异巨大,反向业绩承诺的补偿义务加剧了主并方的财务恶化,并伴随着外部融资能力下降、融资成本上升和外部评级下降,表明反向业绩承诺确实侵害了中小股东利益。在我国资本市场发展多年的情况下,本文解释了为何明显侵害中小股东利益的一项异常交易安排仍然得以发生,对完善市场监管具有重要意义。

To safeguard the interest of the acquirer in M&A transactions,the target company is expected to make performance commitment to the acquirer while the acquirer rarely makes performance commitment to the target company,namely reverse performance commitment.In this paper,we explore the determ in ants and consequences of the transaction with reverse performance commitment in an A-share listed company,Sichuan Western Resources Holding Co.,Ltd.The antecedent analysis shows that:(1)The performance commitment is unusual in terms of compensation direction,payment amount and enforcement conditions,but investors fail to identify potential risks before the disapproval of the regulatory institution.(2)The previous regulatory approval system can detect and veto transactions with reverse performance commitment,but the regulatory switching focus from beforehand to afterwards makes it possible for firms to avoid pre-supervision by means of within-firm voting;the stock exchange has paid attention to expropriation risks behind such uncommon transactions,however,no effective actions are taken after issuing comment letters several times.(3)Both intermediaries,in eluding security an alysts,media and auditors,and internal governance mechanisms,including shareholders and board of directors,fail to deter reverse performance commitment from implementation.The consequence analysis shows that after the completion of the merger transaction,the actual-committed performance gap of the target company is enormously huge,which exaggerates the deterioration of the financial condition and operational performance of the acquirer,rising financial cost and reducing financial capacity and credit rating.Therefore,reverse performance commitment indeed does harm to the interest of minority shareholders.Given that Chinese capital market has experienced decades of development in corporate governance,this paper provides a con textual analysis about why an apparently abnormal transaction with a nature of tunneling is still able to occur eventually,which shall have implications for market regulation in China.