摘要
因为《联合国海洋法公约》规定不明,发展中沿海国和传统海洋强国对专属经济区外国军事活动持不同立场。传统海洋强国选择性适用“荷花号”推理,单方面主张在专属经济区享有不受约束的军事活动自由的“剩余权利”,否定发展中沿海国具有管控专属经济区内军事活动的“剩余权利”,这种做法并不符合法理及公约第59条规定的公平分配“剩余权利”的要求。为公平分配专属经济区内有关军事活动自由和管控的“剩余权利”,利益冲突双方可以参考《美苏关于防止公海及其上空意外事故的协定》双边条约,通过缔结条约,用立法解释的方式补充《联合国海洋法公约》不足,预防和减少专属经济区内的军事摩擦。
As the relevant regulation in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS)is insufficient,developing countries and maritime powers diverge on the issue concerning foreign military activities in an exclusive economic zone(EEZ).Maritime powers apply the Lotus reasoning in a selective manner,claiming unilaterally the residual right to unrestricted military freedom in an EEZ while denying that coastal states have the residual right to restrain military activities in this area.Such practice is not in accordance with the juridical logic and Article 59 of the UNCLOS implying that the distribution of residual rights should be based on equity.In order to distribute residual rights concerning military freedom and relevant restraints equally,disputing parties can conclude bilateral treaties such as the Agreement between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas,filling the gap in the UNCLOS and helping prevent and reduce military frictions in an EEZ.
作者
卢婧
LU Jing(Sun Yat-sen University)
出处
《边界与海洋研究》
2021年第5期80-94,共15页
Journal of Boundary and Ocean Studies
基金
“广东省哲学社会科学规划学科共建项目(项目批准号GD20XFX09)”
第66批中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目支持(资助编号:2019M663334)阶段性研究成果。